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"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting
out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."'
"Between truth and untruth there lies a penumbral zone
which belongs to both; and I have often admired the adroitness
with which Mr. Chamberlain sails within the 'half-shadow.' "2
Language in law is rife with metaphors. Judges and commentators
have created a legal landscape inhabited with, among other things, slip-
pery slopes,3 bright and blurred lines,4 constitutional foothills,5 scales of
justice,6 level playing fields,7 and a wall of separation between church
and state.' Metaphors are not just illustrations offering graphic images or
concrete versions of legal concepts. They are models-shorthand ver-
sions of reality that emphasize or exclude in order to make a point. Like
many models, metaphors portray one part of experience by borrowing
terms associated with another part. Thus, they require a jump from one
category of experiences and related descriptive terms to another.
Metaphors that are overtly spatial involve the most obvious kind of
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1987; Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New
York. The author wishes to thank Jan G. Deutsch of the Yale Law School for advice on an
earlier draft of this Article.
1. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
2. Tyndall, Letter to the Editor, The Times (London), Nov. 26, 1884, at 6, col. 6.
3. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258
(1986).
4. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2140
n.23 (1987) ("bright-line"); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268. (1964)
("blurred line").
5. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1, 131 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
7. See, e.g., Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 813 F.2d
1111, 1112 (11th Cir. 1987).
8. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
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category jump. With such spatial metaphors,9 legal ideas are described
and discussed as if they existed in two- or even three-dimensional form.
For example, legal ideas often seem to have weight as well as volume, as
when interests are "balanced."' 0 Spatial metaphors make it possible to
visualize change. Doctrines can be extended," narrowed,
12 expanded,13
and circumscribed.' 4  Branches are separated" but not hermetically
sealed off.16 Legal rules develop frontiers, 17 cores,' and cutting edges.' 9
Without splitting hairs,2 fine lines get drawn.2' Without using protrac-
tors, lawyers are able to define spheres of influence.
More fundamentally, the very act of judging requires category
jumps-from fact to law, from passion to principle, from persons to
rules. In this sense, all law is metaphoric. It speaks about (and decides)
concrete disputes in abstract terms. Judges use metaphors in their opin-
ions to ease this transition. Spatial metaphors, in particular, remain ab-
stract yet are visual-and thus imaginable. By reifying rules, these
metaphors convey a comforting sense that the law exists "out there" in
the world of objects. It is as if reified rules somehow should be confined
and controlled in a way that mere ideas cannot-as if laws fixed by spa-
tial coordinates should be subject, not only to societal constraints, but to
physical ones like entropy and inertia as well. Judges can even imagine
setting a statute next to the Constitution to see how it measures up. In
9. By "spatial metaphors" I mean metaphors that explicitly call objects and geometric
principles to mind.
Spatial metaphors are ubiquitous in law. Indeed they may be inherent in language. In
language in general, abstract concepts are formed in spatial terms. They arise out of exper-
iences in the world. See J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 707 (1985). White observes
that abstract terms in Romance languages are rooted in space. He notes the counterexample of
"radio", which migrated from an abstract term in physics to identify a household appliance.
Radio comes from the word "radius", however, so even it can be said to have originated in a
spatial term.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987).
11. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 897 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 743 (1961).
13. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 n.3 (1987).
14. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council. 459 U.S. 519, 532
(1983).
15. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3262 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 145 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 417 (1946).
20. See, e.g., Riddle v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 1238, 1249 (6th Cir.
1987).
21. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2519 (1987).
THE PENUMBRA METAPHOR
this way, spatial metaphors allow the process and product of law-making
to be more "objective."
Perhaps the most important and puzzling spatial metaphor in
American constitutional law is Justice William 0. Douglas' "penumbra"
from Griswold v. Connecticut.22 In striking down a Connecticut statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives, Douglas stated for the Court that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by em-
anations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. "23
This Article explores certain questions raised by the penumbra met-
aphor in the law. What was its origin? How does it operate within the
Griswold opinion? What does it signify in spatial terms, that is, what
does its model of the Bill of Rights look like? Finally, what does the
penumbra metaphor reveal about the limits of legal geometry, of law in
space?
I. Penumbra: A Pre-Griswold Scrapbook
Commentators sometimes discuss Douglas' Griswold penumbra as if
the metaphor had never before appeared in American jurisprudence.
The parties' briefs in Griswold did not suggest the penumbra metaphor,
and Douglas has been treated as if he whipped it up out of thin air.24 In
fact, the penumbra metaphor had a long and distinguished history prior
to Griswold, beginning with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.25 The key
pre-Griswold uses of "penumbra" are set forth below in chronological
order grouped according to their author.
A. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
The growth of law is very apt to take place this way: Two
widely different cases suggest a general distinction, which is a clear
one when stated broadly. But as new cases cluster around the op-
posite poles, and begin to approach each other, the distinction be-
comes more difficult to trace; the determinations are made one way
or the other on a very slight preponderance of feeling, rather than
articulate reason; and at last a mathematical line is arrived at by
the contact of contrary decisions, which is so far arbitrary that it
might equally well have been drawn a little further to the one side
or the other. The distinction between the groups, however, is phil-
22. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See infra notes 78-105 and accompanying text.
23. 381 U.S. at 484.
24. See, e.g., 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1377 (L. Levy, K.
Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986) ("This 'penumbra' theory, which has no generative power of
its own, is best understood as a last-ditch effort by Justice Douglas to avoid a confrontation
with Justice Hugo L. Black over a doctrinal issue dear to Black's heart.").
25. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
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osophical, and it is better to have a line drawn somewhere in the
penumbra between darkness and light, than to remain in
uncertainty.26
Extensive research suggests that this 1873 statement by Holmes is
the first time the penumbra metaphor appears in American jurispru-
dence.2 7 Holmes seems to use the word penumbra in its primary mean-
ing: "a space of partial illumination (as in an eclipse) between the perfect
shadow on all sides and the full light."2 8 The penumbra, he suggests, is a
gray area where logic and principle falter. Holmes asserts, however, that
lines should be drawn, even though they are to some degree "arbitrary"
and "philosophical." Judges should press on in spite of reason's limits,
or perhaps because of them. Flanked by polar principles, with cases clus-
tering to one side or the other, Holmes' common-law judge draws a line
through the area of partial illumination. For Holmes, this line-drawing
may even end uncertainty and thereby banish the penumbra-at least
until the common law again needs to "grow."2 9
Perhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been as
sound as the instinct which directed the decisions. It may be that
sometimes it would have been as well not to attempt to make out
that the judgment of the court was consistent with constitutional
rules, if such rules were to be taken to have the exactness of mathe-
matics. It may be that it would have been better to say definitely
that constitutional rules, like those of the common law, end in a
penumbra where the legislature has a certain freedom in fixing the
line, as has been recognized with regard to the police power."
In this passage from Danforth v. Groton Water Co.,3 Holmes clari-
fies his view that penumbral uncertainty is, in effect, a grant of freedom
to the decision-maker. He describes "penumbra" as an area of impreci-
sion lacking mathematical exactness. In the penumbra, we are unencum-
bered by logic and precedent. Indeed, instinct is central to the judge's or
legislator's conclusion. Significantly, Holmes attributes this penumbra of
uncertainty to constitutional provisions as well as to common law
principles.
26. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L: REV. 652, 654 (1873), reprinted in 44 HARV.
L. REV. 773, 775 (1931).
27. See infra note 47. A LEXIS search of United States Reports since 1790 reveals no
other use of the penumbra metaphor prior to 1873. A search of certain law review articles and
other materials likely to contain the metaphor also produced no evidence of earlier use.
28. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 871 (9th ed. 1985).
29. In this first quote, Holmes is addressing the growth of the law. By definition, hard
cases (penumbral cases) make new law.




If this view be adopted we get rid of all questions of penum-
bra, of shadowy marches where it is difficult to decide whether the
business extends to them. We have sharp lines drawn upon the
fundamental consideration of the jurisdiction originating the
right.32
Holmes' use of the penumbra metaphor in the passage above is
doubly spatial. Here "sharp lines" based on the state boundaries of the
empowering jurisdictions can cut through the areas of shadow in the law.
The rule, suggests Holmes, will eventually become as clearly delineated
as a map of the fifty United States.
[W]hile I should not dream of asking where the line can be
drawn, since the great body of the law consists in drawing such
lines, yet when you realize that you are dealing with a matter of
degree you must realize that reasonable men may differ widely as
to the place where the line should fall. I think that our discussion
should end if we admit, what I certainly believe, that reasonable
men might regard six years as not too remote. Of course many
gifts will be hit by the tax that were made with no contemplation of
death. But the law allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes
beyond the outline of its object in order that the object may be
secured. 3
Holmes' use of the penumbra metaphor in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin
is again explicitly spatial. Statutes circumscribe an outline based on their
object. Their reach, however, extends beyond this outline into the pe-
numbra, so that "the object may be secured."'34 This view has been re-
ferred to as Holmes' "penumbra doctrine. '35 It suggests that all statutes
are overly broad because a law's reach will necessarily exceed its aim.
Unlike Holmes' common law and constitutional penumbras, 36 his statu-
tory penumbra 37 is not just an area of uncertainty where logic and lan-
guage falter. Holmes applies the penumbra metaphor as representing the
outer bounds of authority emanating from a law. This statutory penum-
bra does not merely attract with the pull of analogy; it actually presses
32. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concur-
ring) (first appearance of the penumbra metaphor in the United States Reports).
33. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
35. Black, The "Penumbra Doctrine" in Prohibition Enforcement, 27 ILL. L. REV. 511
(1933).
36. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
37. By using the phrase "statutory penumbra", I do not mean to suggest that the penum-
bra metaphor, when applied to statutes, always describes expansive power. Judges also picture
penumbras of statutory provisions as amounting to gaps where intent is uncertain. See infra
notes 57 & 68 and accompanying text.
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outward.38 Like all matters of degree, the precise line where the penum-
bral force ends cannot be determined rationally; it is ultimately based on
the desire or instinct of the judge. Holmes suggests that, when the legis-
lature has been reasonable (meaning not too irrational), further discus-
sion by judges is unproductive.
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one ex-
treme to the other. Property must not be taken without compensa-
tion, but with the help of a phrase, (the police power) some
property may be taken or destroyed for public use without paying
for it, if you do not take too much. When we come to the funda-
mental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be re-
ceived with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.39
In this quotation, Holmes forcefully reiterates his message in Dan-
forth v. Groton Water Co.," decided twenty-seven years earlier, that con-
stitutional law cannot be expected to establish fixed lines. Constitutional
provisions end in penumbras, which may or may not cover a case de-
pending on any number of facts, policies, and phrases. For Holmes, the
Framers did not definitively chart good and bad, permitted and prohib-
ited, light and umbra. Instead, penumbras exist for which the Constitu-
tion is the source of legal authority, but the Constitution does not and
cannot settle questions as to the proper exercise of that authority. And
the more fundamental the constitutional question, Holmes suggests, the
more important it is to acknowledge penumbral uncertainty.
While I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the
penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defend-
ant, although I fully agree that Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy
that goes beyond them. But I think, as Mr. Justice Brandeis says,
that apart from the Constitution the Government ought not to use
evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act. There is
no body of precedents by which we are bound, and which confines
us to logical deduction from established rules. Therefore we must
consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot have,
and make up our minds which to choose. ... We have to choose,
and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
38. Compare Justice Holmes 1873 statement, supra text accompanying note 26 ("new
cases clustering around the opposite poles"), with his later statement in Schlesinger, supra note
34 and accompanying text (statutory penumbra "hits" certain gifts to secure its "object"). The
first penumbra operates by common law analogy; the second exerts statutory force.
39. Springer v. Government of the Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209-10 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
40. 178 Mass. 472, 59 N.E. 1033 (1901). See supra text accompanying note 30.
[V/ol. 15:81
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escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.4 1
In this excerpt from his well-known dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,42 Holmes creates a third application of the penumbra metaphor.
The penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments can shield a crimi-
nal defendant, much like an umbrella. Holmes suggests here that, unlike
the penumbra of uncertainty or the penumbra of statutory force, there is
a protective penumbra created by certain provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Holmes is reluctant to extend this penumbral protection, although
he implies that if the penumbra covered the defendant, that would decide
the case. So, while the scope of the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments is uncertain, the question for the court is not one of line-
drawing within the area of partial illumination, but of determining
whether the case is covered by the penumbra at all. Holmes sketches this
as a problem of interpretation: "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes
beyond them."43 Holmes avoids this problem by switching his focus
from the penumbra of constitutional protection to the penumbra of com-
mon-law uncertainty." He steers clear of the protective Bill of Rights
penumbra, with its independent and binding force, preferring that of the
judge-made common law. While admitting that the Constitution could
cover the case, he simply decides it on other grounds.
B. Justice Benjamin H. Cardozo
In 1932, Benjamin H. Cardozo replaced Holmes on the Supreme
Court. Holmes' influence on Cardozo is no secret; Cardozo openly de-
scribed Holmes in the most reverential terms:
[Y]et we have one judge even now who can vie with the best of
his English brethren, past as well as present, in the art of packing
within a sentence the phosphorescence of a page. If I begin to
quote from the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes, I hardly know
where I shall end, yet fealty to a master makes me reluctant to hold
back.45
41. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469-70 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 469 (citing Gooch v. Oregon Shortline R.R., 258 U.S. 22, 24 (1922) (Holmes,
J.)). In Gooch, the Court narrowly construed a federal statute providing no less than 90 days
for certain tort victims to provide notice of their injuries.
44. The words of a constitututional provision presumably are the core of Holmes' umbral
protection, while the policy related to the constitutional text creates a penumbra of uncertain
coverage.
45. B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 21
(1931).
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Holmes' influence on Cardozo appears to include the use of the pe-
numbra metaphor:
There is in all such controversies a penumbra where rigid for-
mulas must fail. No test more definite can then be found than the
discretion of the court, "to be carefully and guardedly exercised"
in furtherance of justice.46
This appears to be the first use of the penumbra metaphor by a judge
other than Holmes.47 Cardozo used the metaphor at least three more
times after his elevation to the Supreme Court. Each time penumbra was
used to express the same essential idea:
Much that the framers of a schedule are at liberty to do, this
court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction may not require
them to do. For the legislative process, at least equally with the
judicial, there is an indeterminate penumbra within which choice is
uncontrolled. a
The law is not indifferent to considerations of degree. Activi-
ties local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national
because of distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant
may at times be uncertain. There is no penumbra of uncertainty
obscuring judgment here. 9
The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton
and strongly reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of
Madison, which has not been lacking in adherents. Yet difficulties
are left when the power is conceded. The line must still be drawn
between one welfare and another, between particular and general.
Where this shall be placed cannot be known through a formula in
advance of the event. There is a middle ground or certainly a pe-
numbra in which discretion is at large.50
Cardozo employs the penumbra metaphor in Holmes' initial sense-
as an area of uncertainty.5' For Cardozo, the penumbra metaphor de-
scribes an indeterminate zone, where judges have "discretion"52 and
46. Norwegian Evangelical Free Church v. Milhauser, 252 N.Y. 186, 191, 169 N.E. 134,
135 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J.) (quoting Ferry v. Sampson, 112 N.Y. 415, 418, 20 N.E. 387, 389
(1889)).
47. This conclusion is based on a LEXIS search which included United States Reports
since 1790 and New York cases since 1893. Federal District Court and Court of Appeals cases
and the vast preponderance of state cases are not currently in the LEXIS system for years
prior to 1930.
48. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 290, 309 (1934) (Car-
dozo, J.).
49. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).
50. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
51. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
52. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 640. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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their "choice is uncontrolled."53 Like Holmes, Cardozo contrasts line-
drawing in the penumbra of uncertainty with the precision and rigidity of
formulas. 4 Cardozo's penumbra starts where formulaic, settled law
ends.
C. Justice Felix Frankfurter
Can the Kansas Supreme Court transmute the general interest
in these constitutional claims into the individualized legal interest
indispensable here? No doubt the bounds of such legal interest
have a penumbra which gives some freedom in judging fulfillment
of our jurisdictional requirements. The doctrines affecting stand-
ing to sue in the federal courts will not be treated as mechanical
yardsticks in assessing state court ascertainments of legal interest
brought here for review."
President Roosevelt appointed Felix Frankfurter to fill the vacancy
in the Court caused by Cardozo's death in 1938. Frankfurter used the
penumbra metaphor above in his very first term. In more than two de-
cades on the Court, he never used it again. Frankfurter's use of the pe-
numbra metaphor is familiar. Following Holmes and Cardozo,
Frankfurter identifies penumbral uncertainty with judicial freedom and
sets it in opposition to the rigidity of "mechanical yardsticks."56
D. Judge Learned Hand
Compunctions about judicial legislation are right enough as
long as we have any genuine doubt as to the breadth of the legisla-
ture's intent; and no doubt the most important single factor in as-
certaining its intent is the words it employs. But the colloquial
words of a statute have not the fixed and artificial content of scien-
tific symbols; they have a penumbra, a dim fringe, a connotation,
for they express an attitude of will, into which it is our duty to
penetrate and which we must enforce ungrudgingly when we can
ascertain it, regardless of imprecision in its expression. 7
Here, Judge Learned Hand graphically employs Holmes' penumbra
of statutory force. 8 Statutory language (like all language, one suspects)
53. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. at 309. See supra text
accompanying note 48.
54. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
55. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 465 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Of special
interest is the fact that Douglas joined in this concurrence. Douglas went on to use the penum-
bra metaphor several more times prior to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See
infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
56. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 465.
57. Commissioner v. Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (citing Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (Holmes, J.)).
58. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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has "a dim fringe, a connotation."59 But Hand states that the judge can-
not treat this statutory uncertainty as a grant of unbridled discretion. In
Hand's view, the penumbra of a statute must be seen as words radiating
will which judges have a "duty" to "penetrate" and "enforce.
'60
The phrase, "clear and present danger," has come to be used
as a shorthand statement of those among such mixed or compound
utterances which the [First] Amendment does not protect. Yet it is
not a vade mecum; indeed, from its very words it could not be. It
is a way to describe a penumbra of occasions, even the outskirts of
which are indefinable, but within which, as is so often the case, the
courts must find their way as they can.6'
Hand's "penumbra of occasions" 62 is reminiscent of Holmes' cases
clustering around principles. 63 But Hand takes penumbral uncertainty
even further; "clear and present danger"'  never amounted to a clear
distinction. There is no light and dark divided by "a line drawn some-
where in the penumbra. ' 6' Here, all is penumbra, and judges must grope
along "as they can. "66
E. Justice William 0. Douglas
There is no square holding of the Louisiana courts on the
point. The problem lies in the penumbra of Louisiana law, making
all the more difficult a prediction as to what the Louisiana courts
would hold.67
The Labor Management Relation Act expressly furnishes
some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may
not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penum-
bra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statu-
tory sanction but will be resolved by looking at the policy of the
legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy.
68
Here it is plain that the stockholder and those who manage
the corporation are completely and irrevocably opposed on a mat-
ter of corporate practice and policy. A trial may demonstrate that
the stockholder is wrong and the management right. It may show
a dispute that lies in the penumbra of business judgment, unaf-
59. Commissioner v. Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d at 682. See supra text accompanying note 57.
60. Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d at 682.
61. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.).
62. Id.
63. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
64. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212. See supra text accompanying note 61.
65. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
66. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212. See supra text accompanying note 61.
67. General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 169 (1956) (Douglas, J., joined by
Harlan, J., concurring).
68. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (Douglas, J.).
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fected by fraud.6 9
Like Frankfurter, Justice Douglas joined the Court in 1938. In each
of these quotations, Douglas adopts the same syntax. A problem or dis-
pute "lies in the penumbra." In the first two quotations, penumbra de-
scribes the area of doubt outside of the region governed by square
holdings and express, substantive law. One cannot predict how these
problems will turn out. The third quotation is different. Here, the pe-
numbra is akin to Holmes' protective constitutional umbrella. If the dis-
pute is within the "penumbra of business judgment" then management's
decision apparently is insulated from judicial scrutiny. Thus, the judicial
task in the third quotation is not one of line drawing in the penumbra of
uncertainty, but of locating the case inside or outside the penumbra.
F. Professor H.L.A. Hart
After the three Douglas opinions, but prior to Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,70 Harvard law professor H.L.A. Hart published two works in which
"penumbra" appeared prominently.
A judge has to apply a rule to a concrete case-perhaps the
rule that one may not take a stolen "vehicle" across state lines, and
in this case an airplane has been taken. He either does not see or
pretends not to see that the general terms of this rule are suscepti-
ble of different interpretations and that he has a choice left open
uncontrolled by linguistic conventions. He ignores, or is blind to,
the fact that he is in the area of the penumbra and is not dealing
with a standard case.7 1
All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as
instances of general terms, and in the case of everything which we
are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear central
cases, where it certainly applies and others where there are reasons
for both asserting and denying that it applies. Nothing can elimi-
nate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt
when we are engaged in bringing particular situations under gen-
eral rules.72
Both statements illustrate just how accepted penumbra had become
as a metaphor prior to Griswold. In fiat academic prose, Hart sets forth a
strikingly Holmesian analysis. 73 There are penumbras of uncertainty,
but also core areas where the distinctions are clear. On the one hand,
69. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957) (Douglas, J.).
70. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 610
(1958) (footnote omitted).
72. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119 (1961).
73. Indeed, the 1958 piece describes itself as a defense of Holmes. Hart, supra note 71, at
593.
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there is law-a car is a vehicle-and on the other there are hard cases-
an airplane may or may not be a vehicle.
Hart's analysis differs from Holmes' penumbra of uncertainty, how-
ever, in that Hart gives a stronger sense of being able to identify where
certainty ends and uncertainty begins. For Holmes, cases cluster and
shade gradually into the penumbra. Hart, on the other hand, seems pro-
foundly confident that core, "central" cases74 can be distinguished from
penumbral ones. In Hart's view, a judge should be able to draw not just
one line (dividing the penumbra), but two lines (dividing the penumbra,
and distinguishing penumbra from core)."
II. The Griswold Penumbra
In Poe v. Ullman, 6 Douglas and Harlan agreed in separate dissents
that Connecticut's law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples violated the Fourteenth Amendment.77 In his majority opinion
in Griswold, written four years later, Douglas backed off from his four-
teenth amendment position. He wrote that the Connecticut law violated
the penumbral right of privacy, not the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.78
Justice Harlan concurred in the Griswold judgment, but adopted a
different analysis. He described himself as unable to join the Court's
opinion:
[The] approach to this case [is] very much like that taken by
my Brothers Black and Stewart in dissent, namely: the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this
Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found to violate some
right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights.79
To what extent is this statement by Harlan an accurate account of
Black's position? Did Black accept the idea that the provisions of the
Bill of Rights could have penumbras? In his dissent, Black observed, "I
get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional 'right of privacy'
as an emanation from one or more constitutional provisions. "80 How-
ever, he described his disagreement with the Court's opinion as a narrow
74. Id. at 615.
75. Id. at 606-15. Compare Holmes, supra note 26, at 654.
76. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.).
77. Id. at 515 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe v. Ull-
man, the majority rejected an attack on Connecticut's anti-contraception statute based on lack
of standing due to desuetude in the law's enforcement. See Clark, Constitutional Sources of the
Penumbral Right of Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REV. 833, 836 (1974) (comparing Poe with Griswold).
78. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
79. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
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one, resulting from his inability "to stretch the [First] Amendment so as
to afford protection to the conduct of these defendants ..... ,S
Black's use of the verb "stretch" strongly suggests that he viewed
the First Amendment in spatial terms and would have conceded that the
Amendment protected an area encompassing a core of easy cases and a
periphery of harder ones. But Black never used the word "penumbra"
and gave no hint that he pictured the Bill of Rights in anything other
than starkest black and white. 2
Douglas' opinion, like Harlan's concurrence, also leaves several
open issues. If Douglas was attempting to keep his dispute with Black
narrow in Griswold, why did he use the penumbra image (and the model
of the Bill of Rights it represents) so often and so prominently? If Doug-
las did not care about breaking with Black, why did he retreat from his
due process approach in Poe v. Ullman? 3 Perhaps Douglas was thinking
not so much of his relationship with Black but of his relationship with
Holmes. In a sense, Douglas and Black were competing in Griswold for
Holmes' vote and even for the right to bear Holmes' legacy."4
The Griswold opinion is a terse seven pages, very much in Holme-
sian style. In the first paragraph addressing the merits of the case, Doug-
las writes, "overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New
York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation .... 85 Thus,
Douglas proclaims early that his opinion is in the tradition of Holmes'
Lochner dissent.8"
81. Id. at 508 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. See, ag., Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1.960) ("It is my
belief that there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose
by men who knew what their words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be 'absolutes.'"
(emphasis in original)).
83. 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. Another motive, which ought not be dismissed, arises out of the well-known antipathy
between Douglas and Frankfurter. See, e.g., M. UROFSKY, THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELEC-
TIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1987). Douglas first
embraced the penumbra metaphor by joining Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See supra note 55 and accom-
panying text. Frankfurter never used penumbra in an opinion again. One can speculate,
though, that Douglas' use of the term was intended to needle Frankfurter, as part of their feud.
Frankfurter wrote the opinion in Poe v. Ullman but retired before Griswold was heard. "Get-
ting" the Griswold opinion could easily have been seen by Douglas as his triumph over Frank-
furter. Douglas may have emphasized the penumbra metaphor partly to "rub in" his victory.
85. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82 (citation omitted).
86. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating the
classic attack on substantive due process). In his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Douglas also ex-
presses his agreement with Holmes:
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting [in Lochner], rightly said that 'a constitution is
not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people
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In several places in the opinion, Douglas embraces an approach very
similar to Holmes' penumbra doctrine. He states that "[w]ithout those
peripheral rights the specific rights [guaranteed under the Bill of Rights]
would be less secure." Further, "while [the right] is not expressly in-
cluded in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the
express guarantees fully meaningful."87 And, finally "[t]he foregoing
cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance."88 This analysis is purely Holmesian. Only Holmes
advanced the position that "the law allows a penumbra to be embraced
that goes beyond the outline of its object in order that the object may be
secured."89 Others described laws as having cores and penumbras,90 but
Holmes alone argued that the penumbra was sometimes necessary to pro-
tect the core.
Also, prior to Griswold, only Holmes explicitly treated the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights as having penumbras which protect conduct
from government interference. In his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,9' Holmes used the phrase "the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments." 92 Douglas was unquestionably aware of Holmes' Olm-
stead dissent since in 1951 he quoted from it and termed it "powerful." 93
There is every reason to believe that Douglas, with nearly thirty years on
the Court by the time of Griswold, was also familiar with Holmes' consti-
tutional penumbra language from Springer v. Government of the Philip-
pine Islands94 and Danforth v. Groton Water Co.95 In those opinions,
of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of
the United States.'
The error of the old Court, as I see it, was not in entertaining inquiries concern-
ing the constitutionality of social legislation but in applying the standards that it did.
Social legislation dealing with business and economic matters touches no particular-
ized prohibition of the Constitution, unless it be the provision of the Fifth Amend-
ment that private property should not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
367 U.S. at 517-18 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
87. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479, 482, 484.
88. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
89. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See supra
text accompanying note 33.
90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
91. 277 U.S. 438 (1927). See supra text accompanying note 41.
92. 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text.
93. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762-65 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94. 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See supra note 39 and accompany-
ing text.
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Holmes clearly provided a basis for the view that constitutional provi-
sions do not terminate in fixed lines, but have penumbras, and that these
penumbras can sometimes be protective.
So why did Douglas not cite Holmes in Griswold? It is always diffi-
cult to say why something did not happen but Douglas may not have
cited Holmes' penumbra cases because, as applied to Griswold, they were
simply not citable. Olmstead was a very backhanded nondenial by
Holmes of the penumbral protection offered by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. As such, it had no declaratory force. The Springer and
Danforth quotations both grant substantial freedom to the legislature.96
These precedents are not, therefore, great authority for invalidating the
state law in Griswold. Holmes provided Douglas with the intellectual
and linguistic underpinnings for the Griswold opinion, but not the sup-
port of law. Thus, Douglas could not persuasively use precedent from
the penumbra tradition.
Justice Hugo Black, on the other hand, had plenty of ammunition
from Holmes. He began by accusing Justices Byron White and Arthur
Goldberg of relying, sub silentio, on Lochner v. New York,97 a case Black
termed "long discredited."98 Like Douglas, Black sides with Holmes in
Lochner. Black quotes extensively from Holmes in support of the view
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be
narrowly construed. 99 In sum, Black devotes considerable effort to dem-
onstrating that his dissent represents the Holmesian position.
This rivalry raises the issue of who would have garnered Holmes'
vote in Griswold: Black or Douglas? Although such a discussion is nec-
essarily speculative, it is hard to imagine Holmes joining either opinion.
Black wrote with Holmes' pith and authority, but was much more
rigid and simplistic than Holmes in legal temperament. Holmes' straight-
forward, even obvious, statement that "[t]he great ordinances of the Con-
stitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white" 10 was in
basic conflict with Black's view of the Bill of Rights. l ° ' Although
Holmes harbored deep reservations about an overly expansive reading of
95. 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901). See supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
96. See supra notes 30 & 39 and accompanying text.
97. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
98. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514-15.
99. Three times Black quotes Holmes in his Griswold dissent. Id. at 518 n. 11, 521 n. 16,
523 n.19. He also cites Holmes' Lochner dissent. Id. at 523. Like Douglas, Black does not
quote any of Holmes' penumbra language.
100. Springer v. Government of the Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 39.
101. See supra note 82.
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due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, he tempered his opposi-
tion with pragmatic concern for dominant opinion, reasonableness, and
tradition. For example, Holmes stated:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a domi-
nant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
[upon] fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.
10 2
Holmes was, in many senses, a realist, while Black often thumped
his Constitution with the fervor of a true believer.1
0 3
Douglas drew on Holmes' style and language; he even approached
the law in Holmes' fashion-as one of many intellectual interests.' But
though Douglas sometimes spoke with Holmes' words, he lacked
Holmes' voice. In Griswold, Douglas pushed Holmes' penumbra meta-
phor much further than it could comfortably go. Douglas was not refer-
ring to penumbra to express the boundaries of law and language in any of
Holmes' three senses.10 5 Instead, he employed the metaphor as a way to
link text to a new principle and right. This was not the familiar category
jump from law to fact, but an attempt to add to our vision of the Bill of
Rights. It seems doubtful that Holmes would have gone along.
III. Penumbra: A Sketchbook
Spatial metaphors in law invite their audience to picture a principle.
We can see the tail wagging the dog or imagine that wall between church
and state. But what does a penumbra look like? After Griswold, how are
we to imagine the Bill of Rights?
Douglas gives us a number of hints as to his model of the Bill of
Rights. He contrasts specific rights with peripheral rights.'06 According
to Douglas, the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments have
penumbras that constitute "zones of privacy."'0 7 Relationships may lie
"within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees."' 1 8 Douglas seems to be suggesting a model like the
102. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Black, supra note 82, at 879 ("For my own part, I believe that our Constitu-
tion, with its absolute guarantees of individual rights, is the best hope for the aspirations of
freedom which men share everywhere.").
104. Domnarski, Style and Justice Holmes, 60 CONN. BAR J. 251 (1986).
105. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
107. Id. at 484.




This attempt to sketch Douglas' penumbras forces a great number
of questions into view, including:
1. What is the penumbra? The vagueness inherent in language?
Spirit? Will? Policy?
2. Do penumbras expand and shrink, as Holmes suggested, de-
pending on interests involved? Are there core cases that are always pro-
tected? Are there cores at all?
3. If there are cores, do they correspond to the exact wording of an
amendment? Compared to the core of an amendment, how big should
the penumbra be?
4. Should the First Amendment be larger, reflecting a preferred
status? Does it have a greater area of influence? A larger zone of
privacy?
5. What about the Second Amendment? Does not the right to
bear arms relate to the right to be left alone?
6. The Ninth Amendment is not described by Douglas as having a
penumbra. Is the Ninth Amendment unimaginable?
7. Can weplace cases on the model? Is it possible, in other words,
to determine that a case belongs within a core, unprotected, or covered
by one or more penumbras?
8. Do the specific cores of amendments actively emanate force?
Do we have a living constitution in the sense that it has a life of its own?
If so, why are the amendments described as surrounded by penumbras
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and not coronas? 0 9
9. Do "peripheral" rights, like the right of association, 110 have
cores? How could they if they have no letter, no text? But don't they
embrace easy and harder cases?
10. Do we have a picture, perhaps an unconscious one, of what a
provision of the Bill of Rights "looks like?" Which of the following best
approximates that picture?
..,...
• *.-. *,.$"I ' **
figure 2
11. Was Douglas mistaken in portraying the Bill of Rights as hav-
ing individual penumbras? Should we view the Bill of Rights as one pe-
numbra containing cores of text?
109. In Griswold, Douglas described the penumbras as "formed by emanations" from cer-
tain provisions of the Bill of Rights. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See supra note 23 and accom-
panying text. This may amount to a mixed metaphor. Shadows are not emanated, and
emanated light is a corona, not a penumbra.
110. The Griswold opinion states that "[iun NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958),
we protected the 'freedom to associate and privacy in ones associations,' noting that freedom
of association was a peripheral First Amendment right." 381 U.S. at 483. In fact, Harlan's
opinion for the court in NAACP v. Alabama did not use the term "peripheral", although it did
note "the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." 357 U.S. at 460. In his
Griswold dissent, Stewart termed the right of association a "true First Amendment" right. 381





12. If the Bill of Rights has shadows-both umbras and penum-
bras-what is the light source? The police power? The "natural out-
come of dominant opinion," as in Holmes' phrase from Lochner v. New
York?I'" Does not the penumbra model of the Bill of Rights have to be
three dimensional and include the light source, something like the
following?
light source (the majority will?)
Const. amendments
(opaque bodies)
figure 4 penumbra umbra penumbra
Conclusion
It may be that no spatial metaphor can withstand this sort of scru-
tiny. Perhaps any metaphor taken literally will collapse." 2 One proba-
I11. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905). See supra text accompanying note 102.
112. See generally C. TURBAYNE, THE MYTH OF METAPHOR (1962).
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bly could not draw a satisfactory level playing field113 or wall separating
church and state. 114 But there is no need to try. Those metaphors bring
concrete images to mind; one knows instantly what they mean.
Beginning with its use by Holmes, the penumbra metaphor has been
fuzzy and ambiguous. 1 5 By its nature, it evokes no hard-edged sensa-
tion, no clear image. The penumbra metaphor illustrates instead the
problem of law. It expresses, as much as anything, the distance judges
have to travel between fact and law and how poorly equipped they are to
bridge this gap. 16 For this reason, the penumbra metaphor has often
been used as a shorthand for the limits of judicial reasoning. Just as
often (and sometimes simultaneously) judges have used the penumbra
metaphor to convey their discretion. In the penumbra, judges are, to
some extent, free from text and precedent as well as reason. But they are
never freed from responsibility, including the responsibility to try to pen-
etrate what Cardozo called "the mists of metaphor."' 17 Metaphors like
"penumbra" are useful" 8 and are even, at some level, inescapable. In the
long run, though, they are not a substitute for theory.
113. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. Nevertheless, the penumbra metaphor may be more successful than Douglas' bald
assertion in his Poe v. Ullman dissent that "the notion of privacy is not drawn from the blue."
367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116. In this sense penumbra can be referred to, playfully but not wholly in jest, as a meta-
metaphor.
117. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)
("The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is still en-
veloped in the mists of metaphor.").
118. In order to illustrate the facts, to control them more effectively, to induce atti-
tudes, or to inculcate ways of behavior, artists, philosophers, theologians, and scien-
tists have used various devices. An extraordinarily successful one often used to
illuminate areas that might otherwise have remained obscure is the model or
metaphor.
C. TURBAYNE, supra note 112, at 3.
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